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Abstract
A Two-sided Matching System Design for Dynamic Labor Markets
Shixuan Hou, Master
Concordia University, 2019
This thesis designs an automatic two-sided matching system for dynamic labor markets
with large scale of data. Such markets consist of a group of vacancies and applicants, a
matching function, a set of events causing transitions of the state of the market. Due to
the dynamic nature of the labor markets, matching systems based on the classical deferred
acceptance algorithm are not sufficient for producing stable matching solutions. Therefore,
the central theme of this thesis is to address the effectiveness and efficiency of generating
matching results in dynamic large labor markets.
The main contribution of this thesis consists of three dynamic matching algorithms and
a agent-based matching system design. The dynamic matching algorithms are extensions
of the classical deferred acceptance algorithm. The first algorithm generates a vacancy-
optimal stable matching result without considering locking or break-up constrains. The
second algorithm considers locking period constraints in the matching process and the third
algorithm computes applicant-optimal stable matchings with the consideration of break-up
penalties in dynamic environments. To verify the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed
matching algorithms, theoretical proofs and experimental results are presented as well. The
results indicate that the designed system can be used as an efficient and effective tool for
recruitment management in today’s dynamic and internet based labor markets to reduce
administrative work load of human resource departments and produce stable job allocations.
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There are a lot of markets in which transactions are completed bilaterally. Such as marriage
markets with single men and single women, college admission markets with students and
colleges and labor market with job-seekers and employers. These markets are called two-
sided matching markets that each individual on one side looks for a matching counterpart
on the other side. This thesis focuses on labor markets in which there are two joint groups:
applicants and vacancies.
1.1 Labor markets as two-sided matching markets
In general, labor market is regarded as a workplace that can allocate applicants into
appropriate vacancies. Unlike commodity markets which focus primarily on the supply
and demand of resources, the critical factors in the processes of allocation in labor market
are “personal desires”[1]. In fact, labor markets are much more complex than commodity
markets, because each individual in the market has his or her own desire rather than simple
transaction. Each applicant should signal his or her passion, credentials and drive while
employer of each job position offers salaries, perks and prospects for advancement.
There are two groups of participants determine the supply and demand in labor markets,
namely vacant job positions and job applicants. They form two disjoint sets and the process
of labor forces allocation is a bilateral selection process. These are the major characteristics
of two-sided matching market, “two-sided” and “matching” [2]. The term “two-sided” refers
to the fact that participants in such markets belong to one of two disjoint sets, such as
firms or workers as well as men or women; and “matching” refers to the bilateral nature of
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exchange in these markets, such as if I work for some firm, then the firm employs me and
if I marry a girl, then the girl marries me [3].
1.2 Challenges of two-sided matching in labor markets
In their seminal paper [4], Gale and Shapley proposed a criterion, stability, to measure
the quality of outcome of a two-sided matching market. Later, stability is regarded as one
of the most important standards of matching market. Stability of the matching results
is also a critical criterion for evaluating the quality of a labor market. A labor market
that produces stable job allocations will reduce employers’ recruiting and training costs,
therefore, improve their market competitiveness. From system design perspective, in this
thesis, if a matching system produces stable matchings, we say the matching system is
effective. It is known that the deferred acceptance algorithm can obtain stable matches
between job position and applicants in static two-sided markets which assume complete
strict preferences and unchanging environments [5]. However, real-world labor markets are
full of imperfect and asymmetric information, which is difficult for each side in the labor
market to acquire complete and real-time information over the opposite sides [6]. Therefore,
a strict preference list of participants, which is a critical information for operating deferred
acceptance algorithm, seems to be impossible to be offered.
In addition to imperfect information, today’s labor markets are more dynamic, which
means they are more flexible and complex environments which involve more frequent
variation and more unpredictable behaviour. David Andolfatto concludes that labor market
has some dynamic characteristics [7]: 1) persistence and variability; 2) cyclical movement
and 3) negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment. In such dynamic labor
markets, a matching system should consider various uncertainties before giving a solution of
matches between workers and employers. In addition to imperfect information and dynamic
environments, large scale of data is becoming a third challenge facing labor market designers.
In recent years, Web, as a worldwide information resource, are widely applied for conducting
online search for information about jobs’ and applicants [8]. Entor analyzed the condition
of employment in both the United States and Western Europe, and gave the conclusion that
computer plays an important role in labor market to help employees obtain higher salaries
[9]. In addition, early recruitment-related activities on the internet also affect decision
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of each job seeker’s applications, it involves activities—publicity, sponsorship, word-of-
mouth endorsements, and advertising, all the four activities are the major approaches for all
applicants to acquire information of firms or vacancies [10]. Besides sufficient information
and high-speed server, internet of information technology brings greater scale of data [8].
Given those challenges, matching systems based on the static deferred acceptance
algorithm cannot operate in many modern labor markets with impact information and
dynamic environments. Current manual processes which are still used by many companies
do not have the ability to handle large scale data produced by numerous social media
accounts and internet job search engines. Although job search engines have become
important tools for any human resource departments, they only provide job position and
candidate information. They currently do not provide automated two-sided matching with
stable outcomes.
1.3 Proposed solution and contributions
From two-sided market perspective, we can see that the internet can help both vacancy side
and applicant side exchange their preference information. Therefore, it has the potential
to improve matching stability. On the other hand, since internet data can be processed
more efficiently using automated computer systems, we now have the opportunity to design
matching systems which can produce effective matchings in a more efficient way in large
scale and dynamic market environments.
In this thesis, I design a two-sided matching system for dynamic labor markets with
large scale of data. The core matching algorithms proposed for the system are extensions
of the classical deferred acceptance algorithms. I considered three dynamic settings: 1)
free matching, 2) matching with locking period constraints, and 3) matching with break-
up penalties. In the free matching setting, when dynamic events occur, matching system
can re-do the matching freely to achieve new stable matchings. The setting of matching
with locking period constraints is motivated by the study from Clark and Summers [11].
They show that people frequently entering or leaving labor market will cause higher
unemployment. In our setting, every matching has a locking period within which the
two sides are locked in. They cannot rematch to others. We study how the adjustment
of locking periods can affect the stability of the market in dynamic environments. The
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motivation of the setting of matching with break-up penalties is from the observation by
Kugler in [12]. The author found that firing costs determines the matching decision of a
labor market. Our system will also consider firing costs when making matching decisions
in dynamic labor market environments.
1.4 Outline of the thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 identifies a critical conflict of
labor market by analyzing a core requirement based on the Environment Based Design
methodology. Chapter 3 reviews the literature of deferred acceptance algorithms and present
its detailed application in static labor market. Chapter 4 proposes three extended algorithms
from classical deferred acceptance algorithms for solving dynamic matching problems.
Chapter 5 proposes a multiagent system to achieve effective and efficient operation of




Requirement analysis using EBD
As mentioned in Chapter 1, current manual operations of deferred acceptance algorithm and
researching engines cannot provide stable matching results for dynamic large-scale labor
markets. Due to the limitation of the current matching approaches, we will design a system
to solve the challenges existed in labor markets. In the chapter, an effective methodology,
Environment Based Design, is introduced to analyze the environment of labor markets. In
addition, we apply the analyzing processes of the EBD to identify critical conflicts and core
environment components for the design of the system.
2.1 Environment Based Design
Environment Based Design (EBD) is a design methodology developed over the last 20 years
[13], which originally stems from the observation that the purpose of design is changing an
existing environment to a desired environment by generating a new object, such as products
or services.As we know that design is dependent to environment, it starts from environment,
functions for environment and changes environment. The processes of environment changing
accompanied by the recursive evolution of design problems, design knowledge and design
solution. Therefore, some rules for regulating the changing of environment should be given.
There are three basic activities involved in EBD: environment analysis, conflict identification
and solution generation. The analyzing processes for dynamic labor market is based on the
first two activities: the environment analysis and conflict identification.
In the following sections, by applying EBD, I will analyze the requirements of current
labor markets and generate critical conflicts and core design environment components by
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following the sequence of environment analysis and conflicts identification. Some related
analyzing approaches like recursive objects model (ROM) diagram and performance network
will be applied as well.
2.2 Environment analysis
The objective of environment analysis is identifying the environment that how the desired
products or services work in the environment. It is usually divided into three types, natural
environment, built environment and human environment. The processes of analyzing a
environment should include the components and its relationships. In order to define the
components as well as the relationships, a recursive object model (ROM), a linguistic tool
in design, is helpful for generating the definition of each objects in a design problem.
The design problem can be described as:
• Design an effective and efficient system for dynamic large-scale labor market.
A ROM diagram, based on the problem statement, is shown in Fig.2.1:
Figure 2.1: ROM Diagram
The processes of generating the definition of each objects in ROM diagram is helping
designers better understand the design problem through linguistic analysis using ROM. We
have gotten the initial problem statement, further questions of each objects should be asked
for collecting information that may have significant affect on our design problem. We can
observe that the core object of the design is “sysetm”, for defining the object, “dynamic
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labor market”, “effective” and “efficient” should be defined firstly. The question generating
process is shown as follows:
• What is “dynamic”?
“Dynamic” means constant change.
• What is “labor market”?
“Labor market” is a marketplace that match vacancies and applicants.
• What do you mean by “effective”?
“Effective” refers to the stability in labor market.
• What do you mean by “efficient”?
“Efficient” refers to do something well and thoroughly with less waste of time.
• Who “design an effective and efficient approach for dynamic labor market”?
The human resources manager in labor market design an effective and efficient approach
for dynamic labor market.
• Why design such an approach for dynamic labor market?
Because the current system of labor market does not behave well.
According to the answers of each object in initial problem statement, the updated one
is
• Human resources manager designs a system to rapidly form stable and changed pairs
between a large number of applicants and vacancies,
with the ROM diagram as Fig. 2.2:
2.3 Conflict identification
Conflicts are considered as the driving force in EBD analysis process. It is helpful for
designers to develop problem solution for satisfying the requirement of design problem by
identifying properly all conflicts. From the ROM diagram Fig. 2.2, there are some conflicts
and potential conflicts between the relationships of each objects.
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Figure 2.2: Revised ROM Diagram
Each action of the renewed problem statement in the diagram is called interaction.
In order to understand the internal relationships among all the interactions, performance
network helps us figure out conflicts for each interaction. The critical conflict of design
problem is behind the root constrains. The 1st performance network table is shown in
Table 2.1. It is obvious that I3 and I4 constrain I2, while I2 constrains I1, the internal
Interaction Description
I1 Human resources designs a system
I2 System matches applicants with positions
I3 System achieve stability
I4 System within less time
Table 2.1: Interaction Description 1st Round
relationships are shown below in Fig 2.3.
It is found that there exists potential conflicts in Interaction I3 and I4. Two more
question is generated based on these two interactions.
• How to achieve stability?
Each applicant has no tendency to break up with assigned vacancy. And each vacancy has
no tendency to break up with assigned applicant.
• why do you need match within less time?
Current matching function are operated by manual.
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Figure 2.3: Performance Network 1st Round
The conflict in I3 is the requirements of both applicants and vacancies, and the conflict
in I4 is the requirement of efficiency is constrained by manual matching. Then renewed
interactions and Performance Network are given in Table 2.2 and Fig 2.4.
Interaction descriptions
I5 Applicant has no tendency to break up
I6 Vacancy has no tendency to break up
I7 Automatic matching improve efficiency.
Table 2.2: Interaction Description 2nd Round
Figure 2.4: Performance Network 2nd Round
Therefore, after analyzing the initial problem statement, we finally found the most
critical conflict, that is, “manual operation constrains the efficiency and effective of a
matching system in labor market”. In addition, the core requirement of the design problem is
concluded as “Design an automatic system to produce stable matching between applicants
and vacancies even though the changes occur constanely”. And based on the definition
of conflict, an insufficiency of resources for an object to produce a desired action on its
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environment or to accommodate the object’s action on its environment.
We conclude four points: 1) environment: dynamic labor markets with large scale of
data; 2) object: two-sided matching system; 3) desired action: generate stable matchings
with fast response time. 4) Insufficiency of resources: Manual matching process is
insufficient to produce stable matchings in large markets and classical deferred acceptance
algorithms cannot be applied directly to dynamic labor market environments.
2.4 Summary
Based on the EBD requirement analysis, two core requirements of design problem for the
limitation of current approaches in dynamic labor market are identified as: 1) effectiveness:
the matching results generated by the designed system should be stable; 2) efficiency: the
system should automated generate matching with fast response time. Associated dynamic
matching algorithms will be proposed in Chapter 4, followed by a multiagent system to
achieve matching automation in Chapter 5.
10
Chapter 3
Static matching model and
Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
In Chapter 1, we know that labor markets are the marketplaces where applicants offer
their skills to vacancies in exchange for wages, salaries, and other forms of compensation.
The major function of labor markets is a special allocation where “personal desires”
are considered. The allocating processes are defined as “matching”, and labor markets
are defined as “two-sided matching markets”. To solve the matching problem in two-
sided matching markets, a classical algorithm named deferred acceptance algorithm was
proposed. In the chapter, I will review the literature related to the evolution of two-sided
matching theory and the application of deferred acceptance algorithm in different domains.
Furthermore, the specific application in static labor markets will be presented as well, which
is the basis of dynamic matching algorithm design.
3.1 Evolution and application of Deferred Acceptance
Algorithm
Gale and Shapley [4] firstly proposed the classical deferred acceptance algorithm, which has a
profound influence on two-sided matching market. In the paper, they proposed two models,
one is college admission model, which is a typical many-to-one two-sided matching market,
and the second one, the marriage model is adopted to illustrate how deferred acceptance
algorithm works in realistic applications. Besides, a concept of stability is also proposed
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by describing unstable situation that if an agent in the market prefers being unmatched to
being matched with assigned mate and if a pair of agents prefer being matched with each
other to being matched with assigned mate. Also, the proof of stability of matching results
produced by deferred acceptance algorithm is given in the paper. Wilson [14] compared
the matching results produced by classical assignment algorithm with the matching results
generated by deferred acceptance algorithms under the criterion of stable marriage [4]. The
comparisons showed the result based deferred acceptance algorithm is better than other
algorithm for solving the classical assignment problem. Roth [15] considered some games
in a matching problem that each agent in both disjoint groups has preference over opposite
side would like to be matched with front choice in his or her preference list. The presented
paper mainly focuses on how to give agents incentive to tell truth about their preferences
in order to produce a stable matching result, and demonstrates two principal results that
a matching procedure exists to yield a stable outcome and give agents incentive to tell
truth about their preferences. And Roth [16] proposed a two-sided matching model of
hospitals and medical students. Each agent in both sides has its preference list, besides
hospital has a quota which is the number of job positions for the students. And this
paper gave the proof of stability for many-to-one matching labor market. In addition,
it is mentioned that the agents in the market are prepared to act on the incentives to
truthfully tell about their preferences. Three years later, Roth [3] did some more works in
the domain of two-sided matching, he studied two-sided matching processes as a game with
incomplete information. He pointed that if each agent in the market does not know the
preference of all agents except himself. all equilibria of incomplete information need not
occur. After that Roth [17] pointed out that the failures of market in which the markets
are addressed by centralized and deterministic matching procedures, seem to be associated
with instability of the outcomes. But in decentralized environment, like labor market, the
failures are not observed yet. The paper demonstrated that stable matching can be arise
with positive probability from a situation that all agents are unmatched or some blocking
pairs are randomly chosen to match. And he believed it is possible that the matching results
can be global optimality. On the basis of Roth’s work, Zhou [18] proved that there exists an
equilibria through G-S algorithm in marriage model, if the preference profile is true. Mongell
and Roth [19] studied the history and organization of recruitment processes of sororities.
They analyzed the influence on stability of matching result and longevity of the system
12
caused by the incentives to stategic behaviours under a centralized matching procedure.
Sasaki and Toda [20] built a two-sided matching model with externality, and they proposed
a new concept of stability and prove that the stability exits generally. Furthermore, if the
stability satisfy Pareto optimality was given as well.Dutta and Masso [21] studied the two-
side matching problems of labor market. That is the matching between individuals and
institutions, and each of them has a preference list over all the agents over the opposite
side. But some changes may occur if an individual’s preference is effect by others, the
writer studied the consequences for stability of the case. Sonmez [22] studied the two-
sided matching problem between hospitals and medical residents in the United States, and
hospital-optimal stable matching solution had been applied before. The author proposed
a manipulation via pre-arranged matches in centralized environment and proved there is
no solution that is both stable and non-manipulable. Balinski [23] explored a new class of
matching problem in college admissions. It is not the same as GS’s [4] college admission
model, it is centralized and via standardized tests. In addition, the concrete application
is also presented by Turkey college admission. After detailed analysis of Turkey college
admission, the author pointed out the current mechanism Turkey applies has a lot of
serious deficiencies, especially, it is inefficiency, vulnerability to manipulation, furthermore
the potential of penalizing students for improved test scores. Hence, deferred acceptance
algorithm is an alternative mechanism to improve the performance college admission in
Turkey and get an student optimal matching result. Roth [24] reported on the design of a
new clearinghouse to match new physicians with provided positions. It is found that simple
matching theory shows a good approximation in the labor market, and a fact that in the
market, each applicant can interview for only a small fraction of positions to explain the
reason why the opportunities for strategic manipulation in the market is small. Ausubel
[25] proposed an direct revelation mechanism called “ascending proxy auction”, it is a
kind of “deferred acceptance algorithm” and is similar to two-sided matching problem. As
analyzed, the author pointed out the auction algorithm is also an allocation of the package
exchange economy associated to some preference lists of agents in the bidding market.
Hiroyuki Adachi [26] concludes the definition of two-sided matching, “two-sided” means
there are two disjoint sets of agents in one market, for example, in labor market, firms and
workers. “matching” refers to the fact that it is a bilateral nature of exchange process. For
example, if a worker works for a firm, at the same time, the firm pays the worker. And this
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paper proposed a search model of two-side matching with consideration of nontransferable
utility to achieve an equilibrium which tells both sides of agents will complete mating upon
meeting. Ehlers [27] consider another aspects in the theory of two-sided matching, the
author gave a definition of strategic choice for a worker in labor market, which is used
to provide suggestions for the worker when she offers her preference lists. It works for
producing three types of choices that firms would never accept her proposal, the firms may
accept her proposal and the rest firms who must accept her proposal. Based on these, an
effective preference lists would be given. Abdulkadirouglu [28] found that in Boston school
matching problem, it is costly to list a first choice that a student do not succeed in admitted
because, when other students are assigned their first choices, they can not be displaced even
by a student with higher priority. Deferred acceptance algorithm is applied for the problem
and avoid this situation. Satterthwaite [29] proposed a decentralized dynamic two-sided
matching market with incomplete information over other agents. In the market, time is
discrete and utility of each agent is considered as well. In the market, after trade is done,
the buyers and sellers exit the market with their real utility. The paper gave us a direction
to investigate dynamic labor market, of which time is discrete and utility of each agent
determine the matching results, meaning trades or contracts. Korkmaz [30] studied a two-
sided matching problem in military, assigning personnel to positions. The author proposes
a new kind of agents, detailers, who is charge on producing matches to satisfy needs and
preferences of commands and personnel in both sides. Also, the effects of the length of
preference lists are examined in the paper. Roth [31] pointed out a centralized marketplace
with deferred acceptance algorithms works well because it solves the problem of thickness of
market and reducing congestion when the market is thick. In the environment, each agent
can tell truth about his or her preference. Furthermore, the algorithm is widely used in
labor market and school choice system, he mentioned. Kojima and Pathak [32] proposed a
many-to-one matching market models of labor markets and student placement systems. In
a large scale, they found misrepresentation of preference widely exists under some regularity
conditions. But the conclusion is that if each participant in the market truthfully tells about
their preference, an approximate equilibrium will be found under the student-optimal stable
mechanism. Abdulkadiroglu [33] redesigned New York City high school matching market. In
the previous market, some schools strategical rank students in their preference lists, however
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it is necessary to tell truth to produce stable matching results. The author adopts a student-
proposing deferred acceptance mechanism and break indifference. After analyzing the data
from the recent redesign of NYC high school match, it is found that potential efficiency loss is
substantial. Alpern [34] gave us another aspects on two-sided matching problem, the author
assumed that the preference lists of each side over other side are the same, and proved that
the kind of constrains are realistic and can provide useful solution for designers of matching
mechanisms. Chakraborty [35] studied a two-sided matching market between colleges and
students in the environment of incomplete information. The author pointed out that if
one side of the market can observe entire matching results, the stable matching can not be
generated, while one side of the market observe only their own matches and other sided has
identical preferences, the stability can be achieved. Hałaburda [36] believed that similarity
of preferences can drive unravelling by investigating the reasons and welfare of unravelling
in two-sided matching markets. Chen [37] reviewed the work of other application-rejection
school choice mechanisms including [28], and the author compared the DA mechanism with
Shanghai college admission mechanism, and got a conclusion by comparing the efficiency,
DA is significantly more stable than Shanghai, which is more stable than Boston. Xu
[38] applied two-sided matching theory in VM migration in Cloud computing. The stable
matching problem involving thousands of VMs and servers. Ackermann [39] analyzed GS’s
[4] two-sided matching model, and proposed a question of convergence time. In the paper,
they proved that the random best response dynamics, what the author extended from better
response dynamics, in two-sided matching markets, converges to a stable matching with
probability one. Chen [40] proposed a two-sided matching model between banks and firms
in a loan market, it is a many-to-one two-sided matching problem, which is similar to college
admission model [4]. The paper proposed two main points of obtaining information, one is
geographically closer and the other is prior loans. In a word, the more detailed information
each agent in the market can obtain, the more accurate a preference list of each agent
can be made. Gu [41] adopted two-sided matching theory to manage resource in wireless
network. The author found that after application of deferred acceptance mechanism, the
results show that the performance of resource allocation has higher effectiveness and much
more efficient. Azevedo and Leshno [42] developed a framework to a matching market by
applying supply and demand analysis. They found that the processes of finding a stable
matching is similar to achieve equation of demand and supply. And they viewed the agents
15
in the market as continuum in order to achieve simplification of matching in large market.
3.2 Modeling and computing for static labor markets
A labor market consists a set of agents and their preferences. The agents typically involve
applicants and vacancies. The agents have kinds of individual behaviors, dependencies
and interactions, which are complicated to captured. Therefore, we replace two basic
components of labor market by two well-designed agents, in order to simply represent
complex individual characteristics.
• Job Applicant (JA) Agent
JA agent acts as a job applicant in labor market. The behaving rules of each JA agent
involve: 1) post personal information; 2) rank all vacancies in the labor market into a strict
order list by evaluating the qualification of each vacancy; 3) apply for the preferred vacancy
according to preference list; and 4) make decision which offer proposed by one vacancy he
or she should accept.
• Vacant Job Position Agent
VJP agent acts as a vacancy in labor market. Differentiated with firm-worker labor market,
each vacancy only employs one applicant in the vacancy-applicant labor market. The
behaviours rules of each VJP agent involve: 1) post detailed vacancy information; 2) rank
all applicants in the labor market into a strict order list by interviewing and evaluating
professional skills of each applicant; 3) send offer to the preferred applicant according to
preference list; and 4) make decision which applicant, applying for the vacancy, should be
employed.
For simplification, in the following contexts of this thesis, we replace vacancies and
applicants by VJP agents and JA agents to behave as the concrete objects.
3.2.1 The two-sided matching model of static labor markets
Deferred acceptance algorithm (DAA) is GS[4] designed originally for two-sided matching
problem in College Admission and Marriage Market, they are many-to-one and one-to-one
matching problem respectively. Two groups of unique individuals and bilateral choices
are the factors of a matching market. Compared with commodity market, matching
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market mainly concentrates on the information exchange and manage rather than just
value exchange driven by price. Labor market, as what we analyzed, is kind of typical
matching market involving JA agents and VJP agents, outcome of the market is not simply
driven by the salaries or profits, information collection and comparison is important as
well. Hence, we can regard labor market as a two-sided matching market as the same
as marriage model for the reason that JA agent and VJP agent are one-to-one matching
relationships. Besides, it is more flexible and dynamic for labor market than marriage one,
the variations including like JA agents or VJP agents entering, parts of matches locking or
contracts breaking after a time period. All the behaviours we mentioned before can affect
the stability of a matching result, simply repeating deferred acceptance algorithm can not
handle the problems caused by the changes, some improvement for algorithms as well as
modeling approach are necessary to help us solve the dynamic matching problem in labor
market. In the section, two-sided matching model will be built to describe labor market with
the introduction of deferred acceptance algorithm. Three improved algorithms for solving
matching problem under dynamic environment of labor market will be proposed following
the discrete event system model for describing all possible changes over the market.
Labor market is a typical one-to-one two-sided matching market in which there are two
disjoint groups of agents, including JA and VJP respectively. VJP agent wants to employ
a good JA agent among all JA agents, while each JA agent would like to be matched with
a suitable VJP agent that the agent satisfy his or her basic requirement like salaries. In the
section, we will mainly focus on the matching processes in static environment.
There are two sets of agents, VJP agents and JA agents, denoted by V = {v0, v1, ..., vm}
and A = {a0, a1, ...an} respectively, in the labor market.
Each element in one set has a complete and transitive preference over the agent in the
opposite set. The preference of each agent can be represented as an rank order list of the
form below:
P (vi) = [ao, ap, ..., vi, ..., aq], o, p, q ∈ [0,m], i ∈ [0, n] (1)
where ao is the best choice of vi and ao is a better choice than ap for vi, the relationship
can be denoted by a in-equation as below:
ao >vi ap (2)
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In real-world there exists a special case that part of agents over the opposite side is
unacceptable for a JA agent or a VJP agent. The case can be represented as an in-equation
like the form as below:
vi >vi aq (3)
That means vi prefers being unmatched to being matched with aq. For the sake of reducing
workload, we usually ignore the unacceptable choices. Besides, if a JA agent or a VJP agent
is indifferent between any two acceptable mates, or between being unmatched and being
matched with an acceptable mate, we have to break up the ties arbitrarily in order to get
a strict preference list.
The outcome of labor market is a matching, denoted by a function µ: V ∪A −→ V ∪A,
such that a = µ(v) if and only if v = µ(a), and for all a and v either µ(a) is in V or µ(a) = a,
and either µ(v) is in A or µ(v) = v. It is that an outcome matches agents on one side to
the agents on the other side or to themselves, and if v is matched to a, then a is matched
to v.
For commodity market, quality is one of the most significant criterion to measure if a
service or product is good or not. As what we analyzed in 2, in labor market, stability
is what we should consider to achieve high effectiveness. Before giving the definition of
stability in matching market, I will introduce two special cases.
• Blocked by Individual
If an agent k prefers being matched with himself to being matched with his assigned mate
µ(k) made by market. The case can be represented as follow:
k >k µ(k) (4)
• Blocked by Pair
There are two agents v and a in labor market, which belongs to the set of VJP agents and
set of JA agents respectively. Both of them form a new pair, denoted by (v, a). Each of
them has been assigned before, the matched mates are denoted by µ(a) and µ(v), but for
v it prefers being matched with a to µ(v), while a prefers being matched with v to being
matched with µ(a), the relationships are represented as two in-equations as below, the case
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is called blocked by pair (v, a).
v >a µ(a) (5)
a >v µ(v) (6)
Definition 3.2.1. A matching µ is stable if it is not blocked by any individuals or pairs.
The efficiency of one matching market is measured by stability and the core of a matching
market is that matching results satisfy each agent’s least requirement and no one complains
or has tendency to break assigned mate.
3.2.2 Classic Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
GS [4] proposed a well-known algorithm to solve college admission and marriage two-sided
matching problems. The objective of a labor market is assigning appropriate JA agent
into an acceptable VJP agent to achieve high profits for companies and harvest salary for
JA agents. In addition, recruitment can be viewed as a information and value exchanging
process, which is the features of matching market, as same as marriage market. So deferred
acceptance algorithm can be applied as well in labor market. The processes of getting a
matching result by Deferred Acceptance Algorithm are shown below:
Notation Meaning
V VJP Agents Set
A JA Agents Set
v Any VJP Agent
a Any JA Agent
P (A) All JA agents’ Preference Lists
P (V ) All VJP agents’ Preference Lists
P (a) Agent a’s Preference List
P (v) Agent v’s Preference List
X Matching Result
First(P (v)) Getting 1st Choice of v
Wk JA agent k’s Waiting List
Table 3.1: Explanations for Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
• Step 0:
After information of VJP agents and JA agents has been adequately exchanged. Each agent
uploads a preference list over the opposite side.
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Figure 3.1: Flow chart of Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
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• Step 1:
a. Each VJP agent v sends offer to its first choice (If the agent has any acceptable choices).
b. Each JA agent rejects any unacceptable offers and if more than one acceptable offer is
received, “holds” the most preferred and rejects the rest.
• Step k:
a. Any VJP agent which are rejected at step k-1 send offer to their most preferred acceptable
JA agents who have not rejected them yet. (If there is no acceptable choices of the rejected
VJP agent, the agent makes no offer)
b. Each JA agent holds his or her most preferred acceptable offer and rejects the rest.
• Stop:
if there is no further offers are made, match each JA agent to the VJP agent (if any) whose
offer the JA agent is holding.
Algorithm 1 Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
Input: P (A), P (V );
Output: X;
1: for vi ∈ V do
2: ak = First(P (vi));
3: P (vi) remove ak;
4: Wk ←− vi;
5: end for
6: while exists length(Wk) ≥ 2 do
7: for aj ∈ A do
8: for vi ∈Wj do
9: if aj rejects vi then
10: Wj remove vi
11: if length(P (vi)) ̸= 0 then
12: ak = First(P (vi));
13: P (vi) remove ak;









The processes of Deferred Acceptance Algorithm is shown in Fig.3.1. The corresponding
notations and functions are shown in Table 3.1. And the pseudo-code of Deferred
Acceptance Algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
The major part of the algorithm is combined with two sub-algorithm, proposing and
decision making for VJP agents and JA agents respectively. Then how we could guarantee
that the results generated by DAA are stable? The theorm and proof of stability is
represented as the form of observation:
Theorem 1. The matching results generated by deferred acceptance algorithm is stable
Proof. From the algorithm, no employer ever send an offer for a VJP agent to an
unacceptable JA agent and no JA agent ever apply and send resume to an unacceptable
VJP agent. Hence results generated by DAA are not blocked by any individuals
If some VJP agents prefer to be matched with an JA agent other than the assigned one,
the employer of the VJP agent must, according to DAA, have already sent offer the that
JA agent, and the JA agent has rejected the offer, which means the JA agent has an offer
he or she strictly prefers, therefore, the results generated by DAA cannot form a blocking
pair
3.3 Summary
In the chapter, I reviewed the evolution of two-sided matching theory and application of
deferred acceptance mechanism in different domains. In addition, a two-sided matching
model of considered labor market is presented and the matching process of the deferred
acceptance algorithm in the model are introduced in detail. Based on the contexts, the
chapter builds a foundation for solving matching problems in dynamic and flexible labor
markets, in next chapter, three dynamic matching algorithms, which are the extensions of
classical deferred acceptance algorithm, will be proposed followed by an automaton model
for describing common dynamics in labor markets.
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Chapter 4
Two-sided matching system for
dynamic labor markets
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the classical deferred acceptance algorithm can generate stable
matching in static labor markets. However, in reality, due to the dynamic nature of the
considered labor markets, the classic deferred acceptance algorithm under-performs both
in solution quality and computational efficiency, especially on large labor markets with
thousands of participants. To solve the problems, I propose three dynamic matching
algorithms, which are the extensions of the classical deferred acceptance algorithm in the
chapter, and dynamic labor markets are modeled as an automaton.
4.1 Discrete event system modeling for dynamic labor
market
In the day-to-day life of technological and increasingly internet-dependent world, two things
should be noticed. Firstly, some of the quantities we usually deal with are “discrete”,
typically like counting integer numbers, such as inventories level, how many cars are on a
highway or how many students in a classroom. Secondly, some instantaneous “event”, such
as pushing a button, opening your computer or traffic light turning red. In fact, many of
the things human have invented are “event-driven”: manufacturing facilities, execution of
computer program and the most important, dynamic labor market are typical examples.
The section, we mainly focus on the introduction of discrete event system and its application
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on the considered dynamic labor market.
4.1.1 Discrete event system and its modeling approach
The intuitive definition of system is given as follows [43]:
Definition 4.1.1. A combination of components that act together to perform a function
not possible with any of the individual parts has three core elements, involving input, output
and their relationships.
Based on these, system modeling process starts by defining a set of measurable variables
related to a given system. We collect data of the system by measuring these variables over
a period of time [t0, tf ]. Then a subset of the variables are assumed that we have ability to
vary them over time. The definition of input variables is given by a set of time function as
below:
{u1(t), ..., up(t)} , t0 ≤ t ≤ tf (7)
Next, another set of variables which can be directly measured while varying
u1(t), ..., up(t) are defined as output variables:
{y1(t), ..., ym(t)} , t0 ≤ t ≤ tf (8)
This can be thought of as describing the “response” to the “stimulus” provided by the
input functions. Otherwise, some variables, which are not involved in input and output, are
referred to as suppressed output variables. We present input and output variables through
column vector u(t) and y(t) respectively.
u(t) = [u1(t), ..., up(t)]T (9)
y(t) = [y1(t), ..., ym(t)]T (10)
And some mathematical relationship between input and output are existed in one system
as the form of functions:
y1(t) = g1(u1(t), ..., up(t)), ..., ym(t) = gm(u1(t), ..., up(t)) (11)
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We convert it into the mathematical form as:
y = g(u) = [g1(u1(t), ..., up(t)), ..., ym(t) = gm(u1(t), ..., up(t)]T (12)
This is the simplest modeling process of system. As for the modeling process of dynamic
system, it is much more complex. It was defined as one system where the output generally
depends on past values of the input, compared with static system, what we input determines
the output at current time. In a word, “memory” of system is significant in dynamic system,
hence we give a new concept of “state”, which can describe its behaviour in some measurable
way. Then we give the definition of state:
Definition 4.1.2. The state of a system at time t0 is the information required at t0 such
that the output y(t), for all t ≥ t0, is uniquely determined from this information and from
u(t), t ≥ t0
In general, the state equations is based on the form of differential equations:
x˙(t) = f(x(t),u(t), t) (13)
where x˙(t) denotes the change of state at current time t. Combine the definitions of
state, input, output and the function among the three elements, we can obtain a new model
as the form below:
x˙(t) = f(x(t),u(t), t), x(t0) = x0 (14)
y(t) = g(x(t),u(t), t) (15)
Obviously, the elements in state set x is continuous. However, in dynamic labor market,
the state of system is generally defined as matches between vacancies and applicants,
which are discrete ordered pairs. The dynamic labor is defined as a discrete-state system.
However, the “activities” that be thought of as occurring instantaneously and leading to
the transitions from one state to another are named as “Events”, denoted as E. Based on
the concept of “Event” and “State”, a definition of Discrete Event System (DES) will be
provided as below [43]:
Definition 4.1.3. A Discrete Event System (DES) is a discrete-state, event-driven system,
that is, its state evolution depends entirely on the occurrence of asynchronous discrete events
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over time.
Then, for generating the languages formed by the strings of events in dynamic labor
market according to well-defined rules, a device is proposed as a timed automaton model.
G = (X,E, f,Γ, x0) (16)
where:
X is the state space.
E is the set of events associated with G.
f : X × E → X is the transition function: f(x, e) = x′ means that the state x will be
changed to x′ if event e occurs.
Γ : X → 2E is the feasible event function. Γ(x) is the set of all possible events in state
x.
x0 is the initial state.
This is the same as what we introduced in section 1.3, in addition, the clock structure
associated with automaton G is a set:
V = {vi : i ∈ E} (17)
of clock sequences as:
vi = {vi,1, vi,2, ...} , i ∈ E, vi.k ∈ R+, k = 1, 2, ... (18)
Many system, particularly “human-made” ones, are in fact discrete event system.
The dynamic labor market is a typical example with some required characteristics, for
example, a event of agent entering could drive state transition of discrete ordered pairs. For
detailed describe all possible behaviours of dynamic labor market, in the following, a timed
automaton model will be presented.
4.1.2 Automaton model of dynamic labor market
Compared with static labor markets, dynamic labor markets exist more unpredictable
variation. Some specific events cause the state transition, especially, the transition of
matching results. As proposed in the definition of stability, if an agent prefer being
26
matched with another agent to being matched with assigned mate, the matching is unstable.
However, in dynamic labor market, there always are more excellent agents entering the
market which are better than the previous ones, each agent of previous matching result
inevitably has tendency to break up contracts signed before to obtain better mate, then a
new stable matching should be generated. But it should be noted that frequent transition of
matching results is unrealistic, in order to reduce congestion and the rate of unemployment,
market always stipulate some rules to regulate behaviours of each agent. We conclude three
typical events that cause the state transition of dynamic labor market, and based on these
events, an automaton model will be proposed as well.
• A New Group of Agents Enter the Market.
In a labor market, each vacancy wants to find a suitable applicant, while each applicant
would like to find a good job. In order to satisfy the requirements of each agent, a classical
deferred acceptance mechanism is adopted to produce stable matches for both sides. In
such a stable labor market, new agents are attracted to enter. Therefore, a large number
of agents try to enter the market and ask for stable matching services. There is a problem
of congestion occurring while thickness of a market was solved.
• Partial "Locked-In"
For solving the congestion in large market, and it is normal for partial parts of agents
to sign contract within fixed time. The behaviours of “Signing contracts” are named
“Partial locked-in”, the parts of “locked-in” matches temporarily leave the market and
stop participating in matching activities, but the market still keep their matching results
for future work.
• Unlock
Business cycle widely exists, so does in labor market, the “locked-in” agents have tendency
to return to the market and match with better choice that just enter the market. The
behaviours of returning to the labor market for previous “locked-in” agents are named as
an event “Unlock”.
Based on the definition of discrete event system [43], and features of dynamic labor
markets. We can define a state automaton model for this system in Fig.4.1
G = (X,E, f, V ) (19)
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Figure 4.1: State Transition Diagram of Main System
X denotes a set of matching results which involve three subsets: locked set (denoted by
L), unlocked set (denoted by U) and free set (denoted by F ).
E denotes a set of events occurred in a dynamic labor market. Three types of events
are defined in the model, denoted by α, β and γ.
• α: arrival of a set of vacancies and applicants to the market.
• β: a set of matched pairs are locked
• γ: a set of locked pairs are unlocked
f denotes a state transition function: f : X × E −→ X
V denotes the clock structure of events occurring time.
There is a general example proposing to illustrate the processes of state transition.
Shown in Fig. 4.1.
E = {α, β, γ} X = {x0, x1, ...}
xi = {L,U, F}
L = {(a1, v2).(a2, v3), ...}
U = {(a0, v4), (a3, v0), ...}
F = {(a4, a4), (a5, v5), (v4, v4), ...}
f(xi, α) = xi+1 f(xi, β) = xi+1
f(xi, γ) = xi+1
(20)
As well as the clock structure V , it is illustrated in the sample path of the example (shown
in Fig. 4.2)
28
Figure 4.2: Sample Path of Dynamic Two-sided Matching System
As the sample path shown, at first there is an existing matching result in the dynamic
labor market x0, then a set of applicants and vacancies enter the market and trigger the
re-matching function of the market, then the matching results, the state of the market, is
transferred from x0 to x1. The time periods between x0 and x1 are constrained by clock
structure vα,1. Another set of agents enter the market after vα,2 and trigger the re-matching
function to generate x3, followed by event β, in fact, the event β does not affect the matching
results in labor market, but as what we defined, a state of market is combined by three
subsets, L,U, F , β cause the parts of elements transferred from F to L, then after a strings of
events βααβ, event γ is trigger by clock structure vγ,1 occurs and because of the occurring,
some parts of elements in L set of x8 are transferred to U set, which means the parts if
matches are free to re-match with other agent, but if they want to break up with previous
mate, they have to pay for the penalty. Finally, another set of agents arrives following the
event α and make matching results transferred from x9 to x10.
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4.2 Dynamic matching with locking periods constraints
As the development of Internet technology, the thickness of labor market has been increasing
within time. Each JA or VJP agent can enter one labor market in real-time to seek for job or
employ new staffs. Based on the definition of stability, if there are some JA and VJP agents
who are acceptable choices for other agents in the market, the previous matching results
may be blocked if the ranking of new JA or VJP agents are higher than the current mates.
In order to acquire a new stable matching result, DAA has to be operated whenever new
acceptable JA agents or VJP agents enter the market. We call the algorithm as Re-matching
Algorithm (RMA).
In fact, the algorithm is not efficient, and more congestion are made in the case, because
DAA has to be operated frequently whenever new agents arrive in market, which improves
the workload for managers to allocate applicants into job positions. In addition, it is not
realistic that labor market is open all the time to frequently re-run DAA. Due to this, in
the following, we propose a Re-matching algorithm with locking periods (RAL) to efficiently
finding a stable matching result in the dynamic labor market.
Matching in labor market under the environment of advanced information technologies
is a dynamic process. Each agent has his or her particular behaviours to satisfy his or her
specific requirements, the manager of the market has his or her requirement as well. For
example, JA agent has tendency to begin their career as soon as possible, while VJP agent
wants to firstly employ the most excellent worker before more competitive VJP agent enter
the market. In addition, the manager of the market tries to reduce workload and congestion
of matching. So efficiency is one of the most important characteristics in dynamic labor
market, the algorithm we need to design must satisfy the purposes. RAL is proposed for
that:
• Step 0:
The market obeys the first-in-first-out (FIFO) rule that previous matched pairs should sign
contract within fixed time and temporarily “locked-in”. And according to the evaluation of
new agents, update preference list of each agent in the market.
• Step 1:
1) Each VJP agent sends offer to to its 1st choice (If it has any acceptable and unlocked
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Figure 4.3: Re-matching algorithm with locking periods
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Algorithm 2 Re-matching algorithm with locking periods
Input: P (A), P (V ), Anew, Vnew, Xk, Afree, Vfree
Output: Xk+1;
1: for vi ∈ Vnew do
2: ak = First(P (vi));
3: if ak ∈ Afree then
4: P (vi) remove ak;
5: Wk ←− vi;
6: else
7: P (vi) remove ak;
8: end if
9: end for
10: while exists length(Wk) ≥ 2 do
11: for aj ∈ A do
12: for vi ∈Wj do
13: if aj rejects vi then
14: Wj remove vi;
15: if length(P (vi)) ̸= 0 then
16: ak = First(P (vi));
17: if ak ∈ Afree then
18: P (vi) remove ak;
19: Wk ←− vi;
20: else










2) If more than one acceptable offers are received, each unlocked JA agent "holds" the most
preferred and rejects the rest.
• Step k:
1) Any VJP agent rejected at step k − 1 makes new offer to its most preferred acceptable
mate who has not rejected the VJP agent. (if no acceptable and unlocked choices remain,
the VJP agent makes no offer)




when no more offers are made, match each JA agent to the VJP agent (if any) whose offer
the JA agent is holding.
Notation Meaning
Anew New JA Agents Set
Vnew New VJP Agents Set
Xk Matching Results in Cycle k
Afree Unlocked JA Agents Set
Vfree Unlocked VJP Agents Set
Xk+1 Matching Results in Cycle k+1
Table 4.1: Explanations for Re-matching algorithm with locking periods
The pseudo-code is shown in Algorithm 2. The notations are shown in Table 4.1 And
the flow chart of RAL is shown in Fig.4.3) as well. The flow chart is combined with two
sub-algorithm of JA and VJP agents decision making processes. The left one is for VJP
agent and the right one if for JA agent. Compared with DAA, even thought the background
of Partial Matching Algorithm has been changed, the stability, representing effectiveness in
labor market, is still one of the most significant features in labor market. The theorem and
proof of stability is shown as follow:
Theorem 2. The matching results generated by Re-matching algorithm with locking periods
is stable
Proof. We have stipulated that no more unacceptable agents are involved in any preference
lists, which means matching results will never be blocked by any individuals. If some VJP
agents would prefer to be matched with a JA agent other than assigned mate. The VJP
agent must, according to the algorithm, have already sent offer to the JA agent, or the
preferred JA agent has been locked before the open day. Hence the results of the market
can not form blocking pairs.
4.3 Dynamic matching with break-up penalties
Free choices are the part of natural rights, each JA agent can reject or accept any offer from
VJP agents, VJP agents also have tendency to employ better staff who can create more
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profits. However, “invisible hand” can not always work, especially under the condition
of the market economy witch allowing unrestrained freedom. A market designer should
consider some constraints on freely choosing, chaos is a kind of the worst scenes in labor
markets, it leads to higher unemployment. But if a labor market restrict agents flows, the
competition and vitality will be decreased. Therefore, manager of a labor market always
set up some mechanisms, like punishment mechanism on firing. The Re-matching algorithm
with Breaking-up Penalty (RABP) is a solution for the condition that any VJP agents can
unlock previous contracts if any better enough JA agents apply for a locked VJP agent.
And any JA agent can break previous contract if any better enough offers of some VJP
agents. If profits, represented as reservation utility, taken from new JA agent, can cover
both reservation utility of previous assigned JA agent and firing cost, VJP agent can break
previous signed contract with assigned JA agent and re-sign a new one with new JA agent.
• Step 0:
Estimate utility u of each JA agent and firing cost c of each VJP agent. Unlock pairs which
were "locked-in" before made by RAL.
• Step 1:
1) Each VJP agent sends offer to its 1st choice (if it has any acceptable choices).
2) Each JA agents, “holds” the most preferred offer that profits of the offer can cover both
profits of previous offer or contract and penalty of previous contract, if more than one
acceptable offers are received.
• Step k:
1) Any VJP agents rejected at step k-1 makes new offer to its most preferred acceptable
mate who has not yet rejected it. (If no acceptable choices remain, it makes no offer).
2) Each JA agent, “holds” his or her most preferred acceptable offer that profits of the offer
can cover both profits of previous offer or contract and penalty of previous contract and
rejects the rest.
• Stop:
when no further offers are made, match each JA agent to the VJP agent (if any) whose
offer he or she is holding.
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Figure 4.4: Re-matching algorithm with Breaking-up Penalty
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RABP’s flow chart, pseudo-code and related notations are shown in Fig 4.4. Algorithm
3 and Table 4.2
Notation Meaning
U(A) All JA agents’ Utilities
C(V ) All VJP agents’ Penalty Costs
Wk VJP agent k’s waiting list
R(ai) ai’s Ranking in vj ’s Preference List
aj,hold vj ’s Old Employee
U(a) a’s Utility
C(v) v’s Penalty Cost
Table 4.2: Explanations for Re-matching algorithm with Breaking-up Penalty
The theorem and proof of stability is shown below:
Theorem 3. The matching results generated by Re-matching algorithm with Breaking-up
Penalty is stable.
Proof. No blocked individuals are made according to estimation of acceptability. And if
some VJP agents v would prefer to be matched to a JA agent a other than its assigned
mate µ(v), it must have already send offer to a and a has rejected it, meaning a has a
contract or offer a strictly prefers or the profits of v is not good enough to cover both
penalty and profits of previous contract or offer. Hence there will be no blocking pairs in
the algorithm.
4.4 Summary
In the chapter, I introduced a timed automaton model for dynamic labor market to describe
some common behaviours of each agent. Three core dynamic matching algorithms are
proposed following that model. It should be noted that only one of the events, new agents
arrival, can drive operation of algorithms, while other events play roles of activating specific
algorithms and transferring specific matching pairs from one subset to another one. Besides,
the stability, which was defined as effectiveness of required system, is proved as well in the
chapter. And in order to improve performance and efficiency of current online job searching
engine by applying proposed dynamic matching algorithms, in Chapter 5, an automated
matching system will be presented in detail.
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Algorithm 3 Re-matching algorithm with Break-up Penalty
Input: P (A), P (V ), Anew, Vnew, Xk, U(A), C(V )
Output: Xk+1;
1: for ai ∈ Anew do
2: vk = First(P (ai));
3: P (ai) remove vk;
4: Wk ←− ai;
5: end for
6: while exists length(Wk) ≥ 2 do
7: for vj ∈ V do
8: for ai ∈Wj do
9: if R(ai) > R(aj,hold) then
10: Wj remove ai
11: else
12: if U(ai)− U(aj,hold) ≤ C(vj) then
13: Wj remove ai
14: if length(P (ai)) ̸= 0 then
15: vk = First(P (ai));
16: P (ai) remove vk;













In Chapter 4, I proposed three dynamic matching algorithms for solving three common
dynamics in current labor markers. The three algorithms are proved as stability for
matching results, meaning that the algorithms can be operated effectively in dynamic
labor markets. And an automated matching system which is responsible for selecting
appropriate algorithms to generate stable matchings according to realistic requirements
will be presented, followed by the simulation and experiments to verify the efficiency.
5.1 Components of multiagent system
Agent-based modeling approaches involving four main components, which are agent
encapsulation, coordination and negotiation protocols, system architectures and decision
schemes for individual agents.
• Encapsulation
Functional decomposition and Physical decomposition are two distinct approaches for a
dynamic matching system, Functional decomposition uses agents to encapsulate modules
assigned to functions such as matching and scheduling. Physical decomposition uses
agents to represent entities in real world, such as job applicants, vacant job positions and
matchmakers.
• Coordination and negotiation protocols
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Most multiagent systems use negotiation protocols for scare resources allocation. In
dynamic matching system, deferred acceptance algorithm is the core protocol to assign
appropriate applicant into acceptable job position. The protocol stipulated the rules that
each agent in the system should tell truth about his or her preference.
• Architectures
Architecture provides a framework to present how agents are designed and constructed.
And architectures for multiagent dynamic matching system fall into three categories:
autonomous agent, federated and hierarchical. According to the specific demand of
system, choose suitable category as the system architecture. Hierarchical architecture is
usually used in a situation that each agent represents a function or a department in a
traditional manufacturing system. And federated architecture solved the problem suffered
by hierarchical architectures due to centralization. Finally, autonomous agent architecture
is well suited for developing multiagent system consisting of small number of agents.
• Decision Schemes
Each agent in one system needs compete negotiate or bargain with other agents, the decision
of each agent mainly depends on two factors: the coordination or negotiation mechanisms
and each agent’s local decision-making mechanisms with sufficient knowledge.
The following sections develop a multiagent dynamic matching system within the four
major components.
5.2 Multi-agent system architecture
Multi-agent system architecture provides designers a framework for describing how agents
are designed and constructed. For improving stability of labor market, matchmakers are
necessary for a multi-agent system architecture to allocate JA agents into VJP agents and
stipulate rules to support the preface proceeding of market. In addition, each JA agent or
VJP agent can be regarded as an autonomous agent who is not controlled by any other
agents and can communicate and interact directly with other agent in the other side. And
each autonomous agent know other agent’s information and is familiar with the environment
of the system. Besides each autonomous agent has their own objects and motivations. For
the reasons, the multi-agent system of dynamic labor market consists of three major agents,
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Figure 5.1: Architecture of MAS for Dynamic Labor Market
Job Applicant Agent (JA), Matchmaker Server Agent (MS) and Vacant Job Position Agent
(VJP), as shown in Fig.5.1
The functionalities of these agents are described as follows:
• Job Applicant (JA) Agent
JA agent acts as an applicant, which has knowledge of applicant’s professional skills
and requirements of vacancies, and has ability to generate preference list by reviewing
information of all VJP agents. Furthermore, each JA agent must upload personal
information to MS agent in order to get widely checked and approved by VJP agents. Each
JA agent should obey the market rules stipulated by MS agent for reducing congestion and
keeping market thick. As for the decision making process of each JA agent, estimating if
an offer made by MS or VJP agents is the preferred to hold temporarily until MS agent
announce market closes, and rejection should be made immediately after decision making
completed.
• Matchmaker Server Agent
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MS agent acts as a server, which can solve operation problem of dynamic labor market
and stipulate rules to keep market stable, efficient and effective. It has the knowledge of
each JA and VJP agents’ information, and is responsible for processing the data to be
visualized forms. Then the visualized forms will be provided to each JA or VJP agent to
acquire preference lists according to the direction of sending message. Also, MS agent takes
charges on the scheduling date of market opening, locking and unlocking, besides, approve
the contracts made by VJP agent is MS agent’s responsibility as well. The decision making
process of MS agent is if the matching is over and inform both JA and VJP agent the final
results. Finally, the utilities of JA agents should be estimated based on the information
provided by JA agents within unlocked period.
• Vacant Job Position Agent
VJP agent acts as a vacancy, which has knowledge of the information and requirements
of the job position, has ability to make preference list by reviewing information of all JA
agents. The information and requirements of each VJP agent should be uploaded to MS
agent for making all JA agents can browse and filter. Every VJP agents in labor market
must obey the rules stipulated by MS agent. And each VJP is responsible for making
contract with assigned JA agent under the supervision by MS agent. It should be noted
that, firing behaviour of each VJP agent can be happened according to the schedules made
by MS agent. And penalty costs of each VJP agents are involved in contracts.
5.3 Interaction protocol
Within the architecture of multi-agent system model, matching service can be seen as a
coordination process between JA agent and VJP agent with the assistance of MS agent.
The matching negotiation processes are automated based on some protocols. The processes
consist of three stages: proposal sending (PS), decision making (DM) and date scheduling
(DS). The negotiation protocols are used in each of the stages. And matching processes
repeat until all the applicants or vacancies are allocated.
• Proposal Sending (PS) Protocol
The protocol contains the following three steps:
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1. Preference Lists Uploading, each proposer (depends on if the market is driven
by offers or applications) upload their strict preference lists before starting the matching
service.
2. Proposal Authorizing, after uploading proposers’ preference lists, each proposer
(depends on if the market is driven by offers or applications) should authorize MS agent to
exercise the power of proposing in order to reduce workload.
3. Proposal Sending, MS agent who is behalf of proposer send proposal to the agents
in the opposite side. If any proposal are rejected, the repeating to send is executed by MS
agent as well.
• Decision Making (DM) Protocol
The protocol contains three steps as well:
1. Preference Lists Uploading, each each receiver (depends on if the market is driven
by offers or applications) upload their strict preference lists before starting the matching
service.
2. Decision Authorizing, after uploading receivers’ preference lists, each receiver
(depends on if the market is driven by offers or applications) should authorize MS agent to
exercise the power of decision making in order to reduce workload.
3. Decision Making, MS agent who is behalf of receiver make decision if a proposal is
rejected or not, and inform MS agent to repeat proposing process if any proposal is rejected
and the proposer still has any choices which has not been rejected.
• Date Scheduling (DM) Protocol
The protocol contains three steps:
1. Open Day, for the sake of reducing congestion, making market thick and getting a
stable matching results, MS agent should make a schedule for stipulating the date allowing
JA and VJP agents enter in market.
2. Applicant Protecting, in order to reduce unemployment and keep stable for labor
market, MS agent set up protection period for applicant that no VJP agent can break
contracts with any JA agents during the periods.
3. Protection Relieving, after a period of protection for JA agents, the contract
breaking behaviours are relived so that VJP agent can employ better JA agent. However
the previous JA agent who is matched with the VJP agent is still be protected by the form
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of penalty, meaning that if VJP agent wants to break previous contract, it will have to pay
the penalty costs to that JA agent. Hence MS agent should make a schedule of relieving
protection for JA agents.
5.4 Decision scheme of agents
Each agent in dynamic labor market has own decision scheme in the processes of
coordination and negotiation. In the section, the decision scheme of agents will be
introduced respectively.
• Job Applicant Agent’s Decision Making
JA agent’s decision making process happens after a matching result is made by MS agent.
Those who has not received any offers or new entering JA agents can decide if apply for a
VJP agent with the help of MS agent or just wait for next cycle of open period. The first
decision works only in the period of protection relieving, because MS agent allows JA agent
to apply for VJP agents only in that period.
• Vacant Job Position Agent’s Decision Making
VJP agent’s decision making process happens after a matching result is made by MS agent.
Those who has not received any applications or new entering VJP agent can decide if send
offer to a JA agent or just wait for next cycle of protection relieving. Because, only in the
period of protection relieving, the JA agent can apply for VJP agent with the help of MS
agent.
• Matchmaker Server Agent’s Decision Making
MS agent’s decision making process happens after all preference lists of JA and VJP agents.
At first, MS agent should make decision of open day on the basis of scale of JA and VJP
agents. Then during the open day, MS agent should make decision if a proposal should
be held or rejected according to the preference list of agent it is acting. In addition, the
duration of applicant protection should be decided according to the environment of the
labor market, while the date of relieving protection depends on the environment as well.
The sequences how the market works based on the protocols and decision scheme of
each agent are shown as a flow chart below in Fig.5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Sequence Diagram of Dynamic Labor market
5.5 System simulation and results evaluation
A simulation for multiagent system of dynamic labor market is given in the section,
some visualized matching results and comparison of correlative parameters, which measure
efficiency and stability, are presented as well.
5.5.1 System simulation
It is assumed that there is a labor market, which is applying proposed multiagent dynamic
matching system. Then a sequence of events are scheduled by MS agent, they follow as
the form: αβαγα. each state X after each event occurs is denoted as coordinates in each
scatter diagrams.
As what we defined in Chapter 4, the matching results are denoted by ordered pairs,
the coordinates are a suitable to present matching results shown in scatter diagrams, from
Fig.5.3 to Fig.5.5. At first re-matching algorithm (RMA) is operated after event α (20*20
agents enter the market) occurs (X0 denotes the initial matching results (40*40) in labor
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(a) X0 (b) X1
Figure 5.3: RMA: X0 α−→ X1
(a) X1 (b) X2
Figure 5.4: RAL: X1
βα−→ X2
(a) X2 (b) X3
Figure 5.5: RABP: X2
γα−→ X3
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market) to get a new result, X1. Then in order to reduce unemployment and chaos, contracts
between parts of VJP and JA agents are signed (Event β occurring), meaning parts of
matches are locked temporarily. Then Re-matching Algorithm with Locking Periods (RAL)
is activated until new event α (20*20 new agents enter the market) occurs, the algorithm is
operated and X2 is the new result computed by RAL. In the following, event γ announces
that all matched pairs are unlocked, which means all agents can break previous ties and
re-match with a better choice, RABP is activated now. Finally, an event α (20*20 agents
enter the market) drives RABP to get X3. But it should be noted that each event has their
unique clock structure (v) to stipulate occurrence time in advance by MS agent.
5.5.2 Consistency comparison
Some obvious features can be observed between three matching results from X1 to X3.
Matching results are changed differently based on different algorithms they operated. As
what we analyzed, a labor market prefers being stable to being chaos, and for reducing
unemployment, each VJP agent prefers employing employed JA agent to employing new
one. Hence a concept of consistency is proposed as a parameter to measure the matching
difference: Ehlers [44] proposed a concept of consistency in allocation problem of house. the
definition the author gave is "a condition of stability when the set of agents and resources
may change". We can find a same condition happens in dynamic labor market, hence I will
propose a similar definition of consistency as follows:
consistency = ns
np
ns denotes the number of same pairs between previous matching results and new ones, and
np denotes the number of pairs in previous matching results.
For not losing generality, ten experiments are made, and consistency of each experiment
computed by different algorithm is shown from Table.5.1 to Table.5.3 and from Fig.5.6 to
Fig.5.15. In each figure, triangle denotes the same pairs compared with last result, while
circle denotes different ones.
Experiment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Consistency 61.25% 46.25% 60.00% 45.00% 56.25% 53.75% 51.25% 41.25% 58.75% 52.5%
Table 5.1: Consistency of RMA
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(a) RMA (b) RAL (c) RABP
Figure 5.6: Consistency comparison
(a) RMA (b) RAL (c) RABP
Figure 5.7: Consistency comparison
(a) RMA (b) RAL (c) RABP
Figure 5.8: Consistency comparison
(a) RMA (b) RAL (c) RABP
Figure 5.9: Consistency comparison
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(a) RMA (b) RAL (c) RABP
Figure 5.10: Consistency comparison
(a) RMA (b) RAL (c) RABP
Figure 5.11: Consistency comparison
(a) RMA (b) RAL (c) RABP
Figure 5.12: Consistency comparison
(a) RMA (b) RAL (c) RABP
Figure 5.13: Consistency comparison
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Experiment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Consistency 86.25% 81.25% 80.0% 73.75% 76.25% 82.50% 88.75% 80.00% 87.50% 87.50%
Table 5.2: Consistency of RAL
Experiment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Consistency 98.75% 98.8% 100% 98.75% 98.75% 100% 98.75% 98.75% 100% 100.0%
Table 5.3: Consistency of RABP
(a) RMA (b) RAL (c) RABP
Figure 5.14: Consistency comparison
(a) RMA (b) RAL (c) RABP
Figure 5.15: Consistency comparison
After observing the results in three tables. We can realize that RMA got the lowest
consistency, meaning that each α leads to big scale of contract breaking, which cause
the increasing of higher costs and time wasting. And it is easy to find that RABP has
higher consistency, compared with RAL and RMA, to keep market consistent, because of
involving utility functions and firing costs which are the most important things a labor
market concerns. But it should be noted that, RAL has a good consistency as well, which
should be applied under some specific scenes, especially in a short-term matching market.
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5.5.3 Evaluation of scalability
The criterion of dynamic matching system are effectiveness and efficiency. The effectiveness,
represented as stability of matching has been proved that three dynamic algorithms can
guarantee. And in the chapter the efficiency is represented as three parameters, running
time, times of message and times of decisions, running time records the time interval between
start and end of producing matching results. Times of message records proposing behaviours
of each algorithm, that is each proposer send offers or application to receiver, the parameter
records the times of the offers and applicants. And times of decision records the decision
making times of each receiver who receive more than one proposal.
The data of the three parameters are shown in Table5.4 to Table5.6:
Scale Running Time Times of Message Times of Decision
100*100 997 368 266
200*200 9975 1324 1116
300*300 18949 1876 1559
400*400 17953 2012 1587
500*500 44867 3266 2737
600*600 40885 3149 2517
700*700 89760 4644 3908
800*800 86737 4817 3962
900*900 173537 7100 6137
1000*1000 220390 7885 6817
Table 5.4: Re-matching Algorithm
Scale Running Time Times of Message Times of Decision
100*100 997 370 264
200*200 3982 571 467
300*300 20917 1658 1441
400*400 25932 1916 1600
500*500 49867 3130 2713
600*600 83789 3175 2651
700*700 80785 3918 3273
800*800 125664 5114 4379
900*900 144533 5271 4428
1000*1000 166555 6926 5971
Table 5.5: Re-matching Algorithm with Locking Periods
We can conclude that the running time of RMA is longer than the other two algorithms,
especially, with the data scale is increasing, RAL works better in efficiency while RABP got
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Scale Running Time Times of Message Times of Decision
100*100 970 417 313
200*200 4987 817 707
300*300 8977 1166 956
400*400 23937 2205 1882
500*500 35905 2738 2314
600*600 58849 3700 3171
700*700 78789 4253 3619
800*800 103718 4929 4184
900*900 100736 4628 3784
1000*1000 141621 5806 4854
Table 5.6: Re-matching Algorithm with Breaking-up Penalty
(a) Running Time (Microsecond) (b) Times of Message (Time) (c) Times of Decision (Time)
Figure 5.16: Comparison of Parameters
the highest efficiency. The units of running time are recorded as microsecond, the results
show that even though the scale of data is increased to 1000*1000, the running time is
still below 1 second. In addition, it is found that as the increasing of scale of data, all
three parameters are grown as exponential (Shown in Fig.5.16), which shows the space of
improving performance in time complicity of algorithms.
5.6 Summary
This chapter proposes a multiagent system to solve automated matching problem in dynamic
labor market. Three dynamic matching algorithms (Chapter 4) are integrated and selected
by the system to produce stable matches in an effective and efficient way. A new concept,
consistency, was defined for represented as the percentage of same matches compared
between previous matching results and current results, which verifies the degrees of stability
the three proposed algorithms can improve in dynamic labor markets. In addition, I defined
three parameters for evaluating the running time and complexity as well as tested 10 groups
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of different scale of data from size: 100 to size: 1000. The results shows that as the increasing
of data scale, running time and complexity are increasing exponentially. But the running
time is still at microsecond level, which verifies the efficiency of the automation system.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and future work
In this thesis, I found a limitation, which exists in current labor market, that current
manual operation of deferred acceptance algorithm and researching engine can not provide
an efficient solution for generating stable matching for dynamic labor markets when the scale
of data grows large. Then I presented a comprehensive application of two-sided matching
theory, which was established as a field over fifty years ago and has developed a solid
theoretical foundation, in labor markets. However, there still exists a significant barrier
of utilizing these models to real-world matching problems, because, as abstractions and
simplifications of real world matching problems, common static matching models do not
address many issues which are of importance for real world application domains. So after
providing the fundamental concepts of discrete event system and discussing the dynamics
of labor market, the thesis investigates a matching problem model derived from labor
market, in which dynamic and flexible environment has a significant influences on matching
results. Finally, I designed an automated matching system which is responsible for selecting
appropriate dynamic algorithms according to requirements of labor markets and stipulate
rules to regulate behaviours of each agent. And in this chapter, we have four parts, based
on core concepts or theories I applied, to present.
6.1 Contribution and uniqueness
The main contribution and uniqueness of the paper are divided into four parts:
• EBD Analysis
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Environment Based Design is a logical and recursive process that aims to provide designers
the right direction for solving a design problem [45]. It is what the thesis applied that
provides a methodology to recursively obtain the requirements of a customer to design a
product or service by analyzing the environment of human, built and natural. As what we
can imagine a system that can produce desired matches efficiently and effectively is what we
need in labor market. But it is not detailed for a designer to reference, we need more accurate
requirement problem statement. ROM analysis helps us expand each words in initial
problem statement and has a whole understanding of design requirements. And performance
network plays a significant role to figure out a critical conflict in the relationships between
objects in requirements. By obtaining the conflicts, the core environment components can
be figured out for further research and design. After a series of processes, in the paper,
the core requirement problem statement, Design an automatic system to produce stable
matching between applicants and vacancies when changes occur constantly, is obtained by
EBD. And the critical conflict is manual operation constrains the efficiency and effective
of a matching system in labor market. Furthermore, the concepts of effectiveness and
efficiency in the thesis are defined ( Chapter 2 ) as stability and automation. The following
contributions are based on the requirement analysis of EBD.
• Multiagent System Modeling
In the thesis, we focus on systems that involve large number of active objects (vacancies,
employers, applicants and matchmakers and like timing, event strings or other kind of
behaviours related to them). Agent-based approach is helpful to capture more realistic
phenomena than other approach that not make much sense being less efficient, harder
to develop pr simply not matching the nature of problem [46]. For a system design for
dynamic labor market, timing, event ordering or other kind of individual behaviours are
what we should consider that simple agent based modeling cannot simulate the complex
environment efficiently. Therefore, Multi-agent system is applied to view each individual
in labor market as an concrete agent to behave. Because in real world, the behaviours of
each individual like applicant and firm are complex, agents can primely replace them to
be involved in labor market. In the paper, we introduced three main agents, vacant job
position (VJP), job applicant (JA) and matchmaker server (MS) agents to behave in order
to get a stable matching results under the dynamic environment. VJP agent acts as an
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vacancy that he or she wants to employ an appropriate applicant in labor market according
to his or her preference list. JA agent behaves as an applicant in the market, who would
like to find an acceptable job for some personal desires, which is presented as preference
lists as well. MS agent is a server or manager of labor market, who can make schedules for
some special events and integrate associated algorithms to produce stable matches based
on the information obtained from JA and VJP agents. In addition, all internal protocols
and decision schemes are proposed as well, which is helpful to stipulate rules of dynamic
labor market, in order to make it stably and orderly operate.
• Discrete Event System Modeling
Dynamic labor market, as what we analyzed, is a typical discrete event system, can be
modeled as a timed automaton, served as an approach to describe all possible behaviours
of each agent in market and generate languages based on the strings formed by events.
We conclude three behaviours to drive state transitions in labor market, agents entering
(α), pairs locking (β) and unlocking all pairs (γ), the three events, especially agents enter
(α) occurring causes instability of matching results. The problem leads to the redesign of
classic deferred acceptance to satisfy dynamic requirements. In addition, matching results
are views as the state of dynamic labor market, the state transitions are triggered by the
three events we proposed before. Each state set of matching results are combined by three
subsets, locked set, unlocked set and free set, each of them represents the matched pairs
that have signed contracts, finished contracts but firing costs should be considered and free
agents that can sign contracts at any time without constrains respectively. Except event
α which totally changes the number of matched pairs, event β and γ just cause the pairs
transition from one subset to another one. Each state set of matching results are combined
by three subsets, locked set, unlocked set and free set, each of them represents the matched
pairs that have signed contracts, finished contracts but firing costs should be considered and
free agents that can sign contracts at any time without constrains respectively. And based
on the algorithms we proposed in Chapter 4, different stable matching can be generated
followed by each event.
• Dynamic two-sided matching algorithms design
Some special events mentioned in automaton model, influence the stability of labor market.
Based on the variations, agents arrival, locking and unlocking, three related algorithms
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were proposed to produce stable matching results when the events occur. They are
dynamic matching by re-running deferred acceptance algorithm (RMA), dynamic matching
with locking periods (RAL) and dynamic matching with breaking-up penalty (RMBP)
respectively. RMA mainly focus on a special case that there is no any constrains about
matching results, no matter who enters the market, rerun the classical deferred acceptance
algorithm. RAL solve a case that if some of pairs signed contracts and temporarily left the
labor market. Finally, RABP provides a solution for a labor market that if the previous
locked pairs return to the market again and have tendency to break previous contracts and
gain higher profits from new matching results.
Furthermore, some experiments are designed to prove the efficiency of each algorithm
with scalability increasing. It is found that the RABP has the lowest time complexity, while
RAL can be applied in some special cases, and RMA is a general solution for some simple
matching environment. And the consistency, as a criterion to measure stability of a market,
of RABP is the best among the three dynamic algorithms. All the three algorithms are
scheduled by the proposed system to achieve effective and efficient matching processes.
6.2 Limitation and future work
In the thesis, preference lists are assumed to be obtained directly after a simple analysis
of personal information. In fact, generating strict preference lists cannot be achieved by
current matchmaker servers. On the other hand, in my system design, it is assumed that
each agent truthfully tell their preferences, however, in order to obtain more benefits in
matching results, strategical decision could be made by each individual in labor markets.
Therefore, it is necessary to have a mechanism to guarantee each agent truthfully tell their
preferences.
And, there are a lot of other variations affecting the stability of a market, in the paper,
the variations are not involved because of length. In the thesis, I verified efficiency of the
system by comparing running time for matching 100 pairs of vacancies and applicants to
1000 pairs of vacancies and applicants. However, larger scale of data exists in labor markets,
which should be verified as well in the future. In addition, the line chart of running time
grows exponentially, meaning that time complexity could be reduced by some improvement.
What’s more, I assume that preference of each agent is available and strict, the assumption is
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not validity in real world, hence there could be more research on the direction to automated
produce preference list for each agent in labor market. These will be the future works.
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